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The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of current internal 
developments in Turkey on the local situation of human rights and 
freedom of press. Furthermore, this article examines these issues within a 
context of the European Union (EU) accession process. In order to provide 
an in-depth analysis, this paper implements and combines process tracing 
and controlled comparison methods. The data are mainly collected via 
several non-governmental and international organizations, specifically 
making use of human rights reports, progress reports, official statements 
and expert analyses. This article is divided into two key parts: the first 
part focuses on the Turkish internal political development and its external 
ramifications and the second part analyses Turkey’s human rights 
records and media freedoms. The article concludes that the significant 
deterioration in human rights and freedom of press was not triggered, 
but only significantly exacerbated by the 2016 coup attempt and that the 
current trend is unlikely to be reversed in a short-to-mid-term period. 
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It is widely recognised that the modern history of Turkey traces 
back to the year 1923, when the country with a prevailing Muslim 
population turned into a secular Republic of Turkey under the 
leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Sambur, 2009). However, 
the events of the recent years suggest that a new Turkish era has 
begun. In this respect, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has emerged as the 
key figure.
Erdoğan founded the Justice and Development Party (Adalet 
ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP) in 2001 and has won every general 
election which took place in Turkey since then. He served as the 
Prime Minister of Turkey between the years 2003-2014 until he 
was elected President of Turkey in the very first direct presidential 
elections that took place in August 2014 (Presidency of the Republic 
of Turkey, 2018).
The aim of this paper is to analyse the impact of current internal 
developments in Turkey on the local situation of human rights and 
freedom of press and to examine these issues within the context of 
the European Union (EU) accession process over the period of 2014-
2017. The tool of this qualitative analysis is the process of tracing 
method, as this paper seeks to analyse the trajectories of change 
and causation between the Erdoğan policy on the one hand, and 
the protection of human rights and Turkish relations with the EU 
on the other. Process tracing focuses on the unfolding of events or 
situations over time and, consequently, captures the key steps in the 
process which will allow for a good analysis of change and sequence 
(Collier, 2011). Therefore, for the purpose of this research, the key 
stages of the political process are defined as follows: (1) Erdoğan 
assumes the presidential office on August 28th 2014; (2) coup d’état 
attempt on July 15th 2016; (3) constitutional referendum on April 
16th 2017.
The Dynamics of Turkish Political Development 
Turkey has always played a vital role in Europe. Turkish economic 
significance is predominantly given by the size of its population, 
which, according to the data of the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), counted over 80 million at the end of July 2017. Furthermore, 
Islam is a dominant religion as 99.8% of its residents adhere to it
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(CIA, 2017). As a result, the European Union (EU)* – Turkish mutual 
cooperation and trade has always been reciprocally beneficial, with 
a whopping potential to continue growing. For instance, between 
the years 2014 and 2016 the EU imports of goods rose by 22.6% 
accounting for 66.7 billion EUR in 2016 on the one hand, and the EU 
export of goods rose by 4.4% accounting for 78 billion EUR in 2016 
on the other; making Turkey EU’s 4th largest export market and 5th 
largest provider of imports (European Commission, 2017).
In political terms, Turkey is a founding member of the United Nations 
and a member of the Council of Europe. However, its strategic 
position within the European continent stems primarily from its 
geographical location and the size of its army, placing it among the 
biggest military forces in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). To be specific, in 2015 Turkey had an estimated strength 
of 639,551 military, civilian and paramilitary personnel placing it 
just after the United States of America (USA), which is the largest 
standing military force in NATO (Forces Network, 2016). However, 
the American population is four times larger than the Turkish 
one. Therefore, a better example for comparison seems to be the 
United Kingdom with a population of almost 65 million, and a 
military strength of roughly 332,000 personnel (CIA, 2017; Forces 
Network, 2016). This data undoubtedly demonstrates Turkish 
military strength, not only in the European, but also in the global 
perspective.
The EU has been always aware of both political and economic 
Turkish significance. Unsurprisingly, the EU-Turkey relations date 
back to 1959, not to mention that already in 1963, an Association 
Agreement was signed. In 1987 Turkey applied for EU membership. 
Consequently, during the years 1999 and 2004 Turkey had a blitz 
on reforms implementation as required by the EU in the fields of 
the state institution stabilisation, rule of law and the protection of 
human and minority rights. More specifically, the reforms covered 
issues such as gender equality in marriage (November 2001), 
allowance of broadcasting in languages other than Turkish (August 
2002), freedom of press (May 2004), abolition of State Security Courts 
(May 2004), etc. (Bac, 2005: 22). This pro-reform period, peaking in 
2004, resulted in the abolition of the death penalty (Embassy of the 
Czech Republic to Turkey, 2017). Subsequently, accession talks with 
the EU were launched the following year.
*  This paper also uses the term European Union for its legal predecessors: Europe-
an Economic Community and European Communities. 
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Nevertheless, according to Peréz-Solórzano Borragán and Juncos, 
the possible Turkish membership in the EU has always been a rather 
controversial issue given (1) its knotty relations with Greek Cypriots 
with no political will for a new approach; (2) its geographical and 
geopolitical situation; (3) its predominantly Muslim population 
which questions Turkey´s European identity; and (4) increasing 
concerns about the democracy, rule of law and the protection of 
human rights under the leadership of Erdoğan (Peréz-Solórzano 
Borragán and Juncos, 2013).
Internal Development
When Erdoğan took over the presidential office, Turkey had a 
parliamentary political system within which a president is typically 
politically impartial and serves a maximum of two consecutive 
five-year terms, and the prime minister is appointed by him. 
President Erdoğan’s effort to extend his executive power within the 
country both de facto and de jure resulted in a constitutional reform 
referendum which eventually took place in April 2017. According 
to the Czech leading television news channel ‘Česká televize’ (ČT), 
which provides political and economic analyses, the reform package 
encompassed, for instance, the following changes: (1) the president 
appoints ministers, public officials and numerous judges in both the 
Constitutional and the Supreme court; (2) the president may issue 
decrees, declare a state of emergency or dissolve the parliament; 
(3) the president may be politically linked to his party; (4) the 
parliament loses its right to interpellation; (5) the parliamentary 
and presidential elections are to be held simultaneously (Česká 
televize, 2017). 
According to Professor of Political Science Vladimíra Dvořáková 
these constitutional changes represent a clear intention to remove 
checks and balances from the Turkish political system and, as such, 
suggest a Turkish path into a non-democratic regime (Česká televize, 
2017). Similarly, the Venice Commission* raised its concerns about 
the Turkish political development and issued an opinion on the 
constitutional amendments in March 2017. The opinion reads that 
the proposed constitutional changes would “lead to an excessive 
concentration of executive power in the hands of the President and 
the weakening of parliamentary control of that power and, further, 
finds that they ‘would introduce in Turkey a presidential regime
*  The Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional law.
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which lacks the necessary checks and balances required to safeguard 
against becoming an authoritarian one” (Venice Commission, 2017: 
12, 29). In addition, Professor of Turkology Petr Kučera argues that 
Turkey, although still a democracy, is approaching an authoritarian 
system, epitomized by a prominent presidential status, and that 
the following two years, including the results of the next general 
elections, will prove whether or not Erdoğan will manage to 
complete Turkey´s system transformation into a dictatorship or not 
(Kučera, 2017).
It needs to be understood that the coup attempt, which took place 
in July 2016, was subsequently largely (ab)used as a pretext for the 
referendum itself. Jakub Szántó, foreign correspondent to Czech 
Television in the Middle East, clarifies that Turkey is a country 
where two main powers continue to clash: (1) political Islam 
currently epitomized by the current president Erdoğan; and (2) 
secular powers represented by the military (Česká televize, 2016). 
On Friday evening July 15th, 2016 parts of the military attempted to 
oust Erdoğan from his office and to take control over the country 
via a coup d’état. Their failure to do so then triggered large-scale 
purges as delineated below. Ultimately, according to the Report on 
Turkey provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), the coup 
attempt led to the declaration of a state of emergency which “allows 
the president and the cabinet to pass laws without the approval 
of parliament and without recourse to the Constitutional Court, 
effectively allowing Mr Erdogan to govern as a president with 
executive powers” (EIU, 2017: 3). Under this rule, the constitutional 
referendum was also held.
President Erdoğan presented the need for the constitutional reform 
as the only way to ensure future stability. However, according to 
researchers Sinan Ekim and Kemal Kirişci from the Brookings think 
tank, the proposed nationwide referendum on several constitutional 
amendments would, if passed…“institutionalize a populist, one-
man system that jeopardizes legislative and judicial independence 
and consolidates them in the office of the president” (Brookings, 
2017a). According to Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Professor 
Kučera, the campaign for ‘yes’ (‘evet’) dominated the public space, 
while the reasons for ‘no’ (‘hayir’) was hardly heard (Human Rights 
Watch, 2017c; Kučera, 2017). Moreover, the president marked his 
– both political and public opponents – as terrorists, effectively 
suppressing their voices in the public sphere (Kučera, 2017), “…the 
state of emergency has created a climate of fear that could deter 
people from voting against the reforms” (EIU, 2017: 3).
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In sum, the constitutional referendum in Turkey was designed 
to provide its president with sweeping constitutional powers. In 
the final results merely 51.4% supported the change, indicating a 
relatively weak support for the suggested reforms (Reuters, 2017). 
Moreover, international observers, just like the Turkish opposition, 
have questioned the legitimacy of the referendum itself (Česká 
televize, 2017). 
External Ramifications
Political elites and scholars have carefully monitored Turkish 
development with some pundits, claiming that the reform measures, 
as stipulated in the referendum, have finally closed the Turkish EU 
membership prospectus (Kučera, 2017). Steven A. Cook, a senior 
fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations think tank, said: “Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan didn’t just win his constitutional referendum — 
he permanently closed a chapter of his country’s modern history” 
(Foreign Policy, 2017). 
In addition, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe* 
(PACE) approved a resolution on April 25th, 2017 to re-impose a 
monitoring procedure on Turkey over concerns about the current 
democracy and human rights development. It is worth noting that 
the Council of Europe only applies its human rights monitoring 
procedure to countries when they are being admitted, thus the re-
implementation of monitoring mechanisms in the case of Turkey is 
largely unprecedented. Unsurprisingly, this has provoked a fierce 
Turkish reaction supplemented by a predictable rhetoric of the 
Turkish government which stated that PACE’s resolution serves 
as an evidence of ‘islamophobic’ and ‘xenophobic’ sentiments 
across Europe (The Guardian, 2017). To sum up, serious concerns 
regarding further Turkish political development were raised.
Kemal Kirişci states that Turkey found itself in an environment 
where it faces two main challenges which, consequently, affect 
its foreign policy: (1) fragile pro-EU integration atmosphere 
rocked by Brexit, rising populism, and Cold War-like rivalry with 
Russia; and (2) instability in the Middle East. His colleague from 
Brookings Torrey Taussig perceives Turkish attempts to improve 
ties with Russia as a merely pragmatic political step, “Turkey uses 
*  The Council of Europe is a leading human rights organization in Europe founded 
in 1949.
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its relationship with Russia as leverage vis-à-vis its European and 
NATO partners”, she adds (Brookings, 2017b). Moreover, Turkey 
and Russia share common interests as far as the Syrian question 
is concerned, since instability and chaos in their neighbourhood 
threatens their own stability and security to a certain extent.
Possible rapprochement with Russia could further negatively 
affect EU-Turkish relations. Nonetheless, Turkey can ill afford 
further deterioration of its relations with the EU because, firstly, 
it is its main trading partner, since 44.5% of its export is, in fact, 
directed to the European market (European Commission, 2017). 
Secondly, “chaos in the neighborhood has resulted in the loss of 
lucrative markets for Turkish exports—which, in return, increases 
the value to Turkey of Western markets” (Brookings, 2017b). To 
put it differently, the European Union and Turkey are to a certain 
extent mutually interdependent, both economically and politically, 
regardless whether Turkey ever becomes an EU member state or 
not.
Analysis: Human Rights and Freedom of Press
There are numerous ways how human rights violations in Turkey 
could be and are assessed. Ranging from the calculation of casualties 
caused by the clashes between the security forces and Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) to the erosion of media freedom, different, 
both local and international, agencies and non-governmental 
organizations focus on varying aspects that human rights 
encompass. In spite of a relatively high publicity and reporting that 
surrounds such a controversial issue, there is, particularly from the 
perspective of Western public, a tremendous gap in understanding 
the degree of human rights violations before the July coup attempt 
and after it. In other words, there is oftentimes a prevailing myth 
that human rights violations were tolerable before the coup attempt 
and that only with the introduction of a state of emergency did 
Turkey’s human rights record deteriorate considerably. 
Although it is appropriate to say that the July coup attempt allowed 
Turkish government to significantly strengthen its repressive 
vigour, particularly in regard to local human rights, it would be 
wrong not to underline a steady increase in such a vigour prior 
to the coup attempt itself (United Nations Human Rights, 2014). 
Hence, it is important to stress that from a certain perspective the 
attempted coup can, and should be seen as nothing but a catalyst 
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for a plummeting record in local human rights – not an initiator as 
it is oftentimes the case. 
Human Rights and Freedom of Press Prior to the Coup Attempt 
As indicated above, the unfavourable record in local human rights 
violations has been steadily increasing several years before the 
coup attempt itself. This has been most significantly epitomized 
by Erdoğan’s rise to power and AKP’s policies undermining local 
rule of law and human rights. The intensification of governmental 
interference in the criminal justice system, efforts to clamp down 
on internet freedoms or attempts to increase government control 
over the local judiciary branch can all serve as Prima Facie evidence 
(Human Rights Watch, 2015). 
Nonetheless, the starkest and highly medialized violation of human 
rights in the period prior to the coup attempt began on May 30th, 2013, 
when the Turkish police cleared the Gezi Park in Central Istanbul of 
protesters who opposed its destruction. Apart from denying these 
protesters their right to a peaceful protest, the abusive approach 
(tear gas, violence, burning of protesters’ tents etc.) used by the local 
police triggered large-scale protests across almost all of Turkey’s 
81 provinces (Amnesty International, 2013). In total, the security 
forces dispersed 1,134 protests which resulted in killing eight 
protestors and injuring over 8,000 people. Furthermore, numerous 
protestors were subjected to arbitrary arrests and detentions, not to 
mention that a number of human rights activists has been similarly 
persecuted for alleged links to terrorist organizations. In fact, up to 
255 protesters were accused of producing propaganda for terrorist 
organizations or of possession of an illegal substance (United 
Nations Human Rights, 2014). Nevertheless, for instance, the Joint 
NGO Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review stated 
already in 2014 that a number of civil society groups, advocating 
and supporting issues such as minority or LGBT rights, have been 
targeted since 2010 (Universal Period Review, 2014). Inferring from 
these examples, it is clear that governmental intolerance towards 
both protests and active civil society existed prior to the coup itself, 
and that it was perhaps even steadily increasing. 
It is worth noting that 2013 also marked the year when strong 
rhetoric between the so-called Güllenists (generally supporters of 
the Hizmet movement led by the US-based cleric Fethullah Güllen) 
and Erdoğan’s circles within the AKP culminated. It was precisely 
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this dispute, representing a long-running rivalry, which was later 
used by Erdoğan as an explanation for who was behind the July coup 
attempt (The Guardian, 2016). In effect, the government blamed the 
movement for exerting its influence within the state institutions, 
the police, and the judiciary before the coup attempt took place 
(Human Rights Watch, 2015). Such rhetoric, generating an image 
of an external threat, was overall congruent with the government’s 
increasing anti-protest sentiments.
The mounting human right violations were during this period 
negatively affected by the collapse of a two-and-half-year long 
ceasefire between the PKK and Turkey. This marked the deadliest 
episodes of this conflict so far. According to the International Crisis 
Group (ICG), between July 2015 and July 2016 more than 1,700 
people were killed. Furthermore, the cycle of violence resulted in 
the displacement of more than 350,000 civilians and the imposition 
of 85 curfews of different durations in 33 major Kurdish south-
eastern districts (International Crisis Group, 2016). 
Overall, it needs to be highlighted that already in the years prior 
to the July coup attempt the Turkish government, under the 
Erdoğan leadership, significantly tightened its political control 
and was becoming increasingly repressive, particularly toward 
anti-government protesters. The breakdown of the ceasefire 
between the PKK and Turkey only strengthened that approach 
and made the deterioration of local human rights conditions more 
visible. Furthermore, as cited in the Human Rights Watch World 
Report: Since 2015, the aforementioned political tightening in 
Turkey has also been evident in the government’s clampdown on 
media freedom, epitomized by criminal defamation cases against 
journalists, disciplinary fines applied to anti-government media, 
blocking content on social media websites, and firing of several 
prominent journalists (Human Rights Watch, 2015). Finally, it is 
worth noting that on January 1st, 2016 – several months before the 
actual coup attempt took place – the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg registered 8,648 pending applications 
against Turkey, also reflecting the fact that Turkey is a state against 
which the highest number of inter-state complaints have been filled 
over the years (Bílková, 2016). 
Human Rights and Freedom of Press after the Coup Attempt
On July 15th, 2016 the already increasingly authoritative govern-
ment faced a coup d’état attempt, which, although ultimately un-
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successful, left approximately 241 people killed and 2,194 injured. 
In its media statements, provided to the local news channels, the 
government subsequently blamed the failed coup attempt on the 
aforementioned Fethullah Güllen and his followers (Al Jazeera, 
2017). The ramifications for local human rights have nonetheless 
been staggering as the coup attempt itself served largely as a pretext 
for strengthening the government’s influence over the press and the 
political atmosphere in general. A state of emergency was declared 
on July 20th, and on July 21st the government informed the Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe about its decision to apply a dero-
gation from the European Convention on Human Rights – allowing 
it in ‘times of emergency threatening the life of the nation’ to der-
ogate from some of their obligations to secure human rights under 
the Convention (Lattmann, 2016). 
According to the Human Rights Watch, under the state of emergency 
numerous provisions were passed, some allowing for dismissal 
from public service without an investigation, police custody of 
up to 30 days or confiscation of property without judicial review. 
Subsequently, over 100,000 public officials and civil servants were 
dismissed or suspended, including 28,000 teachers alleged to be 
Güllen supporters. Similarly, roughly 2,200 judges and prosecutors 
were jailed with 3,400 permanently dismissed and their assets 
frozen, thus, the purge within the Turkish judiciary system overall 
removed one-fifth of its key personnel (Human Rights Watch, 
2017a). 
The state of emergency and administrative purges strongly affected 
local media and freedom of press in general. On July 27th, 2016 
via one emergency decree the government ordered the closing of 
overall 131 media outlets, including radio stations, newspapers, TV 
channels and publishing houses. Subsequently, on September 28th, 
2016 a similar decree shut down 23 radio and TV stations popular 
particularly among Kurds and opposition parties. The overall 
purges left 2,500 media workers and journalists unemployed 
(Human Rights Watch, 2016). 
The overall ramifications of the coup attempt for the local 
human rights conditions have been shocking, as the government, 
particularly via the state of emergency and numerous decrees, 
managed to successfully usurp more power and direct control, 
effectively infiltrating and governing larger space in public life. 
Nonetheless, taking all the aforementioned information and data 
into consideration, it needs to be realized that the coup attempt itself 
did not initiate the worsening of local human rights conditions. The 
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increase in human rights violations has been steadily growing under 
Erdoğan’s leadership for years before July 2016 as demonstrated 
in the ‘Human Rights and Freedom of Press Prior to the Coup 
Attempt’ section. Thus, the coup attempt served both as a catalyst 
by merely speeding up the pace at which local human rights are 
being violated, and as a pretext for allowing the government to 
erode local freedom of press. 
Human Rights and Freedom of Press after the Referendum
Undeniably, the local situation was characterized by heightened 
political tensions prior to the referendum vote. In fact, such an 
atmosphere might also have had a galvanizing effect on the local 
electorate. Although some might argue that the post-referendum 
situation was politically less emotional, it needs to be recognized 
that the local human rights conditions and freedom of press have 
remained largely unchanged. On July 17th, 2017 – a year after the 
failed coup attempt – the Turkish government has for the fourth 
time decided to extend the state of emergency (France 24, 2017). 
The fact that the situation would not necessarily change for the 
better after the referendum was already hinted on April 16th, when 
Turkey’s Central Election Committee (CEC) declared ‘yes’ to be the 
majority vote, and when Erdoğan made statements that his first 
task following the referendum result would be to bring back the 
death penalty – a move which would effectively block the country’s 
accession process into the EU (Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 
2017).
Both the violations of human rights and the violations of freedom of 
press remain staggering. Recently, on July 5th, 2017, ten prominent 
human rights defenders were arrested in Istanbul, accused of 
colluding with terrorist organizations. Among the detainees were, 
for instance, Amnesty International’s Turkey director İdil Eser 
and its founder Özlem Dalkıran (Human Rights Watch, 2017b). 
Similarly, Reporters Without Borders clearly indicate that Turkey’s 
ranking within the World Press Freedom Index has plummeted 
significantly, as Turkey currently occupies the 155th place – it is 
worth noting that in 2002, Turkey was ranked on the 99th place but 
has since been steadily falling behind. Not to mention that Reporters 
Without Borders labelled Turkey, due to the common journalist 
imprisonment without trial, the world’s biggest prison for media 
personnel (Reporters Without Borders, 2017).
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Overall, the post-referendum period has in fact not indicated any 
attempts to reduce the degree of human rights violations and freedom 
of press repression. The continually extended state of emergency 
has only strengthened the current executive branch, providing it 
with unprecedented powers, while significantly diminishing an 
already weak judicial branch, making its independence dubious.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is important to note that the significant deterioration 
in human rights and freedom of press was not triggered, only 
significantly exacerbated by the 2016 coup attempt. In this regard, 
the worsening of the local conditions was becoming strikingly 
apparent even in years leading up to 2016, as demonstrated by the 
government’s reaction to the Gezi Park protests or by its gradual 
elimination of media freedom as noted by the Human Rights 
Watch’s World Report from 2015. The steady worsening of local 
freedom of press before the coup attempt can also be corroborated 
by the continuous deterioration of Turkey’s World Press Freedom 
Index – ultimately hitting its lowest point so far in 2017. 
Taking these data and information into consideration, it needs to 
be recognized that the failed coup d’état only served as a pretext 
for speeding up the process that had started many years prior to 
this event. Consequently, it cannot be expected that such a negative 
trend in human rights conditions and media freedom can reverse 
in a short time, as its origins are not based on, or in any other 
way linked to the July coup attempt or to the subsequent state of 
emergency – as often wrongly assumed. In fact, it is more likely that 
the current trend will keep on systematically advancing, deliberately 
strengthening the role of the executive branch and undermining 
any opposition efforts, whether they be represented by human 
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